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TRUTH IN LENDING: IS NOTICE ENOUGH TO
EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF RESCISSION?
INTRODUCTION
Imagine your home needs repairs so you hire a contractor. However,
you do not have the money to pay the contractor, so you take out a loan
from your local bank with your home acting as collateral. Two years later,
you fall behind on your payments, and the bank is about to foreclose on
your home. After consulting with an attorney, you conclude that the bank
did not provide you with all the disclosures that are required by law. Upon
this realization, you send your bank a notice of rescission. Your bank
receives your rescission notice but denies your claim, arguing that you
received all required disclosures. Now, three years and two months after
receiving the loan, you decide to file suit naming the bank as the defendant
in an effort to force the bank to recognize the rescission. But can you bring
suit more than three years after the loan was commenced?
This issue has led to a circuit split among federal courts of appeals,1 and
on April 28, 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.2 Some courts have
held that the borrower may bring suit after three years, when the statute of
repose has run, as long as notice was sent within the three-year period as
authorized under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).3 Other courts have held
that in addition to the requirement that notice be sent within the three-year
period, suit must also be brought within that period.4 This split has led to
different treatment throughout the country.5
This Note, which deals only with closed-end credit loans,6 argues that
the borrower should only be required to send notice within the three-year
period, consistent with the holdings of the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh
Circuits. Part I introduces TILA and Regulation Z, the regulation that
implements TILA. Part II discusses the facts and holdings of the seven
circuit court opinions7 that have weighed in on this issue, as well as the
1. Robert Boutwell, Federal Circuits Split on Required Action to Effect Rescission Under
Truth-in-Lending Act, BOSTON BANKING LAW BLOG (Nov. 26, 2013),
http://www.bostonbankinglawblog.com/2013/11/federal-circuits-split-on-required-action-to-
effect-rescission-under-truth-in-lending-act.shtml.
2. Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG.COM,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/jesinoski-v-countrywide-home-loans-inc/ (last visited
Dec. 30, 2014).
3. Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 2013); Gilbert v.
Residential Funding L.L.C., 678 F.3d 271, 277–78 (4th Cir. 2012).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2012) (“An obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three years after
the consummation of the transaction . . . .”); Lumpkin v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 534 F.
App’x 335, 338 (6th Cir. 2013); Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2013);
Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1188 (10th Cir. 2012); McOmie-Gray v. Bank of
Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 2012).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part I for definition of closed-end credit loans.
7. The Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have weighed in on
the present issue.
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Supreme Court decision in Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank8 that has played a
role in the disparate treatment throughout the country. Part III discusses
why the ruling in Beach is not dispositive of the instant issue. Part IV
illustrates why notice should be sufficient for exercising one’s right to
rescind. Part V explains some of the concerns the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits had with not requiring suit within the three-year period, why these
concerns are likely overstated, and proposes a solution that eases these
concerns, regardless of whether they are warranted or not.
I. THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT AND REGULATION Z
In 1968, Congress passed TILA.9 TILA was “the first consumer credit
law passed by Congress.”10 Congress’s stated purpose for passing TILA
was to “assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms” so that the
consumer can easily compare “various credit terms available to him.”11
Congress found that the informed use of credit would strengthen
“competition among the various financial institutions and other firms
engaged in the extension of consumer credit” 12 and that “economic
stabilization would be enhanced.” 13 Prior to the enactment of TILA,
consumers had no easy way of comparing various credit terms offered by
different creditors since there was no “uniform way of calculating interest
or a single system for defining what additional charges would be included
in the interest rate.”14
TILA directed the Federal Reserve Board to “prescribe regulations
[that] carry out the purposes” of TILA.15 As such, the Federal Reserve
Board implemented procedures through Regulation Z.16 However, with the
passing of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act,17 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was created and
given rule-writing as well as enforcement and supervisory authority with
regards to Regulation Z. 18 Similar to TILA, the stated purpose of
Regulation Z is “to promote the informed use of consumer credit by
requiring disclosures about its terms and cost.”19
8. Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410 (1998).
9. ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN KEEST, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN
LENDING § 1.2.1, at 4 (7th ed. 2010).
10. DENNIS REPLANSKY, TRUTH-IN-LENDING AND REGULATION Z: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
CLOSED-ENDCREDIT 6 (1984).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. RENUART&KEEST, supra note 9, § 1.1.1, at 1.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2012).
16. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(a) (2011).
17. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
18. RENUART&KEEST, supra note 9, § 1.2.11, at 13.
19. Id. § 226.1(b).
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Regulation Z applies to “each individual or business that offers or
extends credit when four conditions are met,”20 as follows:
(i) The credit is offered or extended to consumers;
(ii) The offering or extension of credit is done regularly;
(iii) The credit is subject to a finance charge or is payable by a written
agreement in more than four installments; and
(iv) The credit is primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.21
Different requirements are imposed depending on whether the transaction is
an open-end credit loan or a closed-end credit loan.22
Open-end credit is consumer credit that is extended under a plan in
which:
(i) The creditor reasonably contemplates repeated transactions;
(ii) The creditor may impose a finance charge23 from time to time on an
outstanding unpaid balance; and
(iii) The amount of credit that may be extended to the consumer during the
term of the plan (up to any limit set by the creditor) is generally made
available to the extent that any outstanding balance is repaid.24
Closed-end credit is all consumer credit that does not fit into the
definition of open-end credit.25 Since this Note deals with an issue arising
from a closed-end transaction, all future discussion of TILA and Regulation
Z will focus on the requirements of a closed-end credit loan.
Certain disclosures must be made for a loan to comply with TILA.26
The CFPB is in charge of prescribing the disclosure guidelines. 27 All
20. Id. § 226.1(c)(1).
21. Id.
22. Compare 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.5–.16 (2012) (Regulation Z provisions dealing with Open-
End Credit), with 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.17–.24 (Regulation Z provisions dealing with Closed-End
Credit).
23. Regulation Z defines the finance charge as
the cost of consumer credit as a dollar amount. It includes any charge payable directly
or indirectly by the consumer and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an
incident to or a condition of the extension of credit. It does not include any charge of a
type payable in a comparable cash transaction.
Id. § 1026.4(a).
24. Id. § 1026.2(a)(20).
25. Id. § 1026.2(a)(10).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms . . . .”).
27. Id. § 1604(a) (“The Bureau shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this
subchapter . . . . [S]uch regulations may contain such additional requirements, classifications,
differentiations, or other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for all
or any class of transactions, as in the judgment of the Bureau are necessary or proper to effectuate
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required disclosures must be clearly written, and in a tangible form the
consumer may keep.28 Additionally, disclosures must be made to each and
every person obligated in the transaction29 prior to the consummation of the
transaction.30 Some of the information that is required to be disclosed by
Regulation Z includes the identity of the creditor, the amount being
financed, the finance charge, and the annual percentage rate.31
In addition to required disclosures, Congress gave the borrower the
right to rescind a transaction as a form of protection. 32 The goal of
rescission was to protect homeowners from questionable practices by
contractors. 33 The right of rescission acts as a cool-off period 34 and
demonstrates Congress’s goal of “giv[ing] the consumer the opportunity to
reconsider any transaction which would have the serious consequence of
encumbering the title to his [or her] home.” 35 The right to rescind is
available in most consumer credit transactions “in which a security interest .
. . is or will be retained . . . in any property which is used as the principal
dwelling of the person to whom credit is extended.”36 However, the right to
rescind is not available in all consumer credit transactions. 37 TILA
§ 1635(e) mentions four transactions where the right to rescind is not
available.38 These transactions are a “residential mortgage transaction”;39 a
the purposes of this subchapter, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate
compliance therewith.”).
28. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.17(a)(1) (2012).
29. RENUART&KEEST, supra note 9, § 4.1.4, at 172; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (2012).
30. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.17(b) (2012).
31. Id. § 1026.18.
32. RENUART&KEEST, supra note 9, § 1.2.1, at 5.
33. See Zakarian v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1213 (D. Haw. 2009)
(“Originally, the Congressional purpose in creating the statutory rescission right was to protect
home owners from certain sharp practices of home improvement contractors (and those financing
such contractors), by creating a rescission right for home improvement loans that were secured by
residential mortgages on existing dwellings.” (citing Heuer v. Forest Hill State Bank, 728 F. Supp.
1199, 1200 (D. Md. 1989))); see also id. at 1213 (“This federal remedy was thought necessary to
protect consumers against surprise and oppression stemming from mortgages unwittingly
executed on homes to pay for often questionable ‘home improvements.’”); see also Lee
Krivinskas Shepard, It’s All About the Principal: Preserving Consumers’ Right of Rescission
Under The Truth In Lending Act, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 171, 191 (2010) (“It is clear that Congress
intended to protect homeowners from abuse by dishonest home improvement contractors who
made questionable ‘home improvements’ financed by loans secured by borrowers’ homes.”)
(alteration in original).
34. Shepard, supra note 33, at 186–87 (“Congress believed that by imposing a ‘mandatory
period for reflection and evaluation, consumers would be less susceptible to high-pressure or
fraudulent creditor practices [that] resulted in an encumbrance on and possible loss of the
homestead.’”).
35. Rodash v. AIB Mortg. Co., 16 F.3d 1142, 1145 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing S. Rep. No. 96-
368, at 28 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 264); see also RENUART&KEEST, supra
note 9, § 10.1, at 575.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012).
37. Id. § 1635(e).
38. Id.
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“refinancing or consolidation” of a loan by the same creditor secured by the
consumer’s principal dwelling;40 transactions involving a state agency as a
creditor;41 and “advances under a preexisting open end credit plan.”42 In
addition to these four exempt transactions, Regulation Z exempts “a
renewal of optional insurance premiums that is not considered a refinancing
under section 1026.20(a)(5).”43
In transactions where the right to rescind is available, consumers have
three business days following consummation of the transaction or when all
required disclosures have been made to exercise that right, whichever is
later.44 However, if the creditor fails to make the required disclosures, the
consumer’s right of rescission expires “three years after the date of
consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property,
whichever occurs first.”45
According to TILA, if a consumer wants to rescind an eligible
transaction he must notify the creditor of his intention to do so.46 Regulation
Z expands on this and states that “[to] exercise the right to rescind, the
consumer shall notify the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram or
other means of written communication.”47
Once the consumer exercises his right to rescind, in accordance with 15
U.S.C. § 1635(a), the consumer
is not liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest given
by the obligor, including any such interest arising by operation of law,
becomes void upon such a rescission. Within 20 days after receipt of a
notice of rescission, the creditor shall return to the obligor any money or
property given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall
take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any
security interest created under the transaction.48
Upon completion of the creditor’s obligations, the consumer must return
any money or property that the creditor has delivered.49
39. Id. § 1635(e)(1). A residential mortgage transaction is defined as “a transaction in which a
mortgage, deed of trust, purchase money security interest arising under an installment sales
contract, or equivalent consensual security interest is created or retained against the consumer’s
dwelling to finance the acquisition or initial construction of such dwelling.” Id. § 1602(x)
(emphasis added).
40. Id. § 1635(e)(2).
41. Id. § 1635(e)(3).
42. Id. § 1635(e)(4).
43. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(f)(5) (2012).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012).
45. Id. § 1635(f).
46. Id. § 1635(a).
47. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(2) (2012).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2012); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(d).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(d).
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II. IS NOTICE ENOUGH? CASE HISTORIES
The circuit split on this topic stems from a case decided by the Supreme
Court in 1998. In Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, the Supreme Court of the
United States decided the question of whether the right to rescind can be
raised as an affirmative defense by the borrowers when the suit is brought
more than three years after the consummation of the transaction. 50 In
deciding whether the borrowers could raise the right to rescind as an
affirmative defense, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining
whether 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) was a statute of limitation or a statute of
repose.51 A statute of limitation limits the period in which a claim can be
brought, but the underlying right is not extinguished and thus recoupment
can be pled.52 However, with a statute of repose the underlying right is
terminated.53 The Supreme Court held that the right of rescission was a
statute of repose, not limitation, since § 1635(f) states the “right of
rescission shall expire.”54 Thus, the liability was extinguished when the
three-year period in § 1635(f) ran, leaving the Beaches unable to assert the
right of rescission as an affirmative defense.55
Since the decision in Beach, six circuit courts have been presented with
the issue of whether notice alone (without being accompanied by litigation)
in the three-year period is enough to rescind. Four of the circuit courts have
held that suit must also be brought within the three-year period,56 while two
have held notice is sufficient.57 In addition, the Eleventh Circuit, in a case
decided prior to Beach, while not directly addressing the present issue noted
that sending notice is sufficient to exercise the right of rescission.58 The
following sections will briefly describe the facts of these cases as well as
the reasoning for their holdings.
50. Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 411–12 (1998).
51. Id. at 416.
52. Id. at 415 (“[A] statute of limitation govern[s] only the institution of suit and accordingly
has no effect when a [defendant] claims . . . a ‘defense of recoupment.’”); 51 AM. JUR. 2D
Limitation of Actions § 10 (2013).
53. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 24 (2013).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2012); Beach, 523 U.S. at 416.
55. Beach, 523 U.S. at 411–12; Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1183 (10th
Cir. 2012) (“Statutes of repose are intended to demarcate a period of time within which a plaintiff
must bring claims or else the defendant’s liability is extinguished.” (quoting Joseph v. Wiles, 223
F.3d 1155, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000))).
56. Lumpkin v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 534 F. App’x 335 (6th Cir. 2013); Keiran v.
Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013); Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1172; McOmie-Gray v.
Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012) (all holding suit must also be filed
within the three-year period).
57. Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013); Gilbert v. Residential
Funding L.L.C., 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012) (both holding that notice is sufficient to rescind
within the three-year period).
58. Williams v. Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1139 (11th Cir. 1992).
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A. CIRCUITSHOLDINGNOTICE IS ENOUGH TORESCIND
a. The Eleventh Circuit
In Williams v. Homestake Mortgage Co., the Eleventh Circuit was
presented with the question of whether the district court had the authority to
“condition [the] voiding of the security interest upon Williams’ return of the
loan proceeds.”59 In reaching its conclusion on the presented issue, the
Eleventh Circuit made clear that § 1635(a) and Regulation Z gave the
consumer the right to rescind “solely by notifying the creditor.”60 Since
then, when presented with the issue of whether notice is sufficient, district
courts have followed the dicta of Williams in holding notice to be
sufficient.61
b. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit was the first circuit court post-Beach to hold notice
to be sufficient. In Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, the Fourth Circuit
was presented with the question of whether notice is enough to exercise
rescission.62 In May 2006, the Gilberts refinanced a loan secured by their
home.63 Less than three years later, a foreclosure action was filed against
the Gilberts. 64 Approximately one month shy of three years from the
consummation of the loan, counsel for the Gilberts sent notice of rescission,
and requested that all security interests on the property be removed and all
consideration paid by the Gilberts be returned due to TILA violations.65
About a week later, counsel for GMAC, as subservicer of the mortgage,66
stated that they would not rescind the transaction due to finding “no basis to
conclude that there were any material disclosure errors that would give rise
to an extended right of rescission.”67 On September 14, 2009, the Gilberts
filed suit in hopes of rescinding their mortgage and preventing the
foreclosure sale.68 In holding for the Gilberts, the Fourth Circuit Court said
that Beach was not dispositive of this issue and that the Gilberts were not
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1139, 1141.
61. Carson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 8:10-CV-2362-T17-EAJ, 2011 WL 2470099, at *3
(M.D. Fla. June 20, 2011) (citing Williams v. Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1141–42
(11th Cir. 1992)); Williams v. Saxon Mortg. Co., No. 06-0799-WS-B, 2008 WL 45739, at *3
(S.D. Ala. January 2, 2008) (“[A]ll that the consumer need do is notify the creditor of his intent to
rescind. The agreement is then automatically rescinded . . . .” (quoting Williams v. Homestake
Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1140 (11th Cir. 1992))).
62. Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 271.





68. Id. at 274–75.
2014] Truth in Lending 369
barred from filing suit after the three-year period. 69 The court held that all
that is required to rescind is notice as prescribed by 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) and
Regulation Z.70
c. The Third Circuit
Similar to the Fourth Circuit, the Third Circuit has held that notice is
sufficient to exercise one’s right to rescind under TILA.71 However, when
first confronted with the issue, the Third Circuit held that notice was not
sufficient and that suit must also be filed within the three-year period.72
The court first addressed this issue of whether notice is enough to
exercise the right of rescission in Williams v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage,
Inc.73 In this case, Williams’ sent notice of rescission a little over two years
after taking out the loan. 74 Never hearing from Wells Fargo, Williams
commenced action against the bank approximately nine months after the
three-year period lapsed.75 The court found that Beach was dispositive and
that suit must be filed within the three-year period to enforce the right of
rescission under § 1635(f).76
Approximately two years later, in Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage
Services, the Third Circuit again was confronted with the issue of whether
suit must be filed within the three-year period. In Sherzer, within three
years of taking out the loans, the Sherzers sent a letter to Homestar and
HSBC77 indicating they were rescinding their loans under TILA.78 HSBC
accepted the rescission with respect to one of the loans the Sherzers took
out but found rescission wasn’t appropriate for the other.79 Approximately
three months after the three-year period expired, the Sherzers filed suit.80
This time the Third Circuit found for the borrowers holding that “the text of
§ 1635 and its implementing regulation (Regulation Z) supports the view
that to timely rescind a loan agreement, an obligor need only send a valid
notice of rescission.”81 Thus, the Sherzers had the right to bring suit to
exercise their right to rescind since notice was sent within the appropriate
time period.82
69. Id. at 277–78.
70. Id.
71. Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 267 (3d Cir. 2013).
72. Williams v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 410 F. App’x 495, 498–99 (3d Cir. 2011).
73. Id. at 498.
74. Id. at 497.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 498–99.
77. The loans were originally with Homestar, but Homestar “assigned both loans to HSBC . . .




81. Id. at 258.
82. Id. at 267.
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B. CIRCUITSHOLDINGNOTICE ISNOT ENOUGH TORESCIND
a. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit court to be presented with the
present issue. In McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans, the Court
held that suit must also be filed prior to the three-year period in § 1635(f)
expiring. 83 McOmie-Gray sent notice within the three-year period. The
bank, however, refused to grant McOmie-Gray’s claim of rescission. 84
McOmie-Gray filed suit seeking rescission, but not until the three-year
period expired.85 The court, feeling bound by the Supreme Court and prior
case law in its circuit, held that sending notice within the three-year period
was not enough.86
b. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit was the second circuit court to find that sending
notice within the three-year period is not enough, and that suit must also be
filed within the three-year period.87 Ms. Rosenfield refinanced an existing
loan on her home in November 2006.88 In September 2008, Ms. Rosenfield
sent a “Notice of Rescission to the lender.”89 However, Ms. Rosenfield
never received a response by HSBC. She stopped making payments as
required under the loan agreement, which led to HSBC “institut[ing]
foreclosure proceedings.”90 On December 21, 2009, over three years after
Ms. Rosenfield refinanced the loan on her home, Ms. Rosenfield filed
suit.91 Ms. Rosenfield argued that she sent written notice within the three-
year period and that it was enough to exercise rescission. 92 The Court
disagreed with Ms. Rosenfield’s argument, finding Beach to be “dispositive
of the [present issue]” and that “written notice to rescind is not enough for a
consumer to invoke [his or her] right to rescission.”93
c. The Eighth Circuit
Approximately one year after the Ninth and Tenth Circuits held notice
is not enough, the Eighth Circuit held similarly in Keiran v. Home Capital,
Inc.94 Keiran consolidated two cases with similar issues.95 In the first case,
83. McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 2012).
84. Id. at 1326–27.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1328.
87. Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1182 (10th Cir. 2012).
88. Id. at 1175.
89. Id. at 1176.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1182.
93. Id.
94. Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2013).
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the Sobieniaks took out a loan secured by their principal residence in March
2007.96 Less than three years after receiving the loan, in January 2010, the
Sobieniaks sent a notice of rescission to the lender who later denied the
request.97 Almost four years after receiving the loan, the Sobieniaks filed
suit in January 2011.98
In the second case, the Keirans took out a loan secured by their home in
December 2006.99 In October 2009, the Keirans sent a rescission notice to
the lender.100 On January 7, 2010, the Keirans were informed that “no basis
for rescission exists.”101 Subsequently, the Keirans filed suit in October
2010.102
The Eighth Circuit, relying on the reasoning laid out by the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits, held that notice is not enough and suit must be filed within
the three-year period.103 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed
that giving notice by itself is insufficient in Hartman v. Smith104 and in
Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 105 with the latter granted
certiorari by the Supreme Court.106
d. The Sixth Circuit
The latest circuit court to hear the issue is the Sixth Circuit in Lumpkin
v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. 107 In Lumpkin, plaintiff Lumpkin
purchased a home in May of 2007.108 In April 2009, Lumpkin went into
default, and a month later, an agent of Lumpkin’s sent a letter, labeled as a
“Qualified Written Request,” to the mortgage company.109 Lumpkin then
filed an action against Deutsche Bank on September 2, 2010.110 On appeal,
Lumpkin argued the “Qualified Written Request” was his notice of
rescission and that this notice exercised his right.111 However, the appellate
court disagreed holding that “[t]he three years defined by § 1635(f) were
over by the time this suit was filed, and so Lumpkin’s right to bring a





100. Id. at 725.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 728.
104. Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752, 760 (8th Cir. 2013).
105. Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 729 F.3d 1092, 1093 (8th Cir. 2013).
106. SCOTUSBLOG.COM, supra note 2.
107. Lumpkin v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 534 F. App’x 335 (6th Cir. 2013).
108. Id. at 336.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 337.
111. Id.
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rescission suit had expired, regardless of when and whether he notified the
lender of his rescission within those three years.”112
III. BEACH IS NOT DISPOSITIVE
While some of the circuit courts have found Beach to be dispositive of
the present issue, Beach did not discuss how one “must exercise his right of
rescission within that three-year period.”113 In fact, the Beaches did not
attempt to rescind in any manner within the three-year period. 114 The
Beaches even “concede[d] that any right they may have had to institute an
independent proceeding for rescission under § 1635 lapsed.”115 What the
Beaches sought to do was claim the “§ 1635 right of rescission as a
‘defense in recoupment’ to a collection action.”116 However, since the right
is one of repose, and not limitation as the Beaches argued, they were unable
to raise the right as a defense.117 Since the circumstances in Beach are
dissimilar from the cases discussed in Part II, 118 the holding of Beach does
not settle the issue.119 The only aspect of Beach relevant to the present issue
is that the right of rescission is a statute of repose instead of a statute of
limitation.120
Furthermore, the circuit courts that found Beach to be dispositive err in
holding that since rescission under TILA is a statute of repose, the right
must be exercised through an action brought with the courts.121 As noted by
112. Id. at 338.
113. Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 262 (3d Cir. 2013); Gilbert v.
Residential Funding L.L.C., 678 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The Beach Court did not address
the proper method of exercising a right to rescind . . . .”).
114. Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 732 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 262 (“The borrowers in Beach refinanced their
house in 1986, and took no action between 1986 and 1989 that could be construed as exercising
their right to rescind.”).
115. Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 415 (1998).
116. Id.
117. Keiran, 720 F.3d at 727.
118. The cases discussed in Part II all sent notice within the three-year period while the Beaches
never sent notice.
119. See Keiran, 720 F.3d at 725 (noting how on October 8, 2009 the Keirans sent rescission
notices within three years of receiving the loan). See also Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 256, 262 (noting
how the Sherzers sent notice of rescission on May 11, 2007, which was less than three years after
consummation of the loan and how the Beaches took no action during the three year period);
Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1176 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting how Rosenfield
sent notice within the three year period); Gilbert v. Residential Funding L.L.C., 678 F.3d 271, 274
(4th Cir. 2012) (noting how the Gilberts sent notice within the three year period); McOmie-Gray
v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting how McOmie-Gray
sent notice of her intent to rescind less than two years after receiving the loan).
120. Beach, 523 U.S. at 416.
121. The circuits holding that notice is not enough are the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth. See
Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1183 (“[T]he concept of repose itself . . . fundamentally limits the ability
to file an action.”); see also Keiran, 720 F.3d at 727 (“[I]t is the filing of an action in a court . . .
that is required to invoke the right limited by the TILA statute of repose . . . .” (citing Rosenfield,
681 F.3d at 1183)).
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the dissent in Keiran, and the CFPB in its amici briefs filed in the
Rosenfield, Keiran, and Sherzer cases, when exercising a right that is
governed by a statute of repose there is no requirement that the action taken
to exercise that right must be by way of a lawsuit.122 While “Congress may
choose to use a statute of repose to make the filing of a lawsuit necessary in
order to exercise a statutory right, . . . when it has chosen to do so, it has
done [so] explicitly.”123 For example, in § 413 of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), which provides an example of a statute of
repose,124 Congress clearly set out that the action taken must be a lawsuit
when it drafted the statute as saying “‘[n]o action may be commenced’
more than six years after the alleged breach of fiduciary duty occurred.”125
Additionally, “[t]he Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [which] provides that
‘[n]o action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this
section, unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts
constituting the violation and within three years after such violation’”126
was found to be a statute of repose.127 Here, both ERISA § 413 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, describe actions having been
“commenced”128 or “maintained”129 to signal court involvement.
In contrast, there are instances where a statute of repose does not
require the filing of a lawsuit.130 For instance, the New York version of the
Uniform Commercial Code (N.Y. UCC) contains a “‘statute of repose’
pursuant to which consumers must ‘notif[y] the bank of [their] objection’ to
122. Keiran, 720 F.3d at 732 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Once a
statute of repose has been triggered, a party faces a deadline within which it must act, but there is
no requirement that the action be a lawsuit.”). See also Brief for the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal at 19,
Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-1442) (“[T]here is no
general rule that a statute of repose can be satisfied only by filing a lawsuit . . . .”); Brief for the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and
Reversal at 20, Sobieniak v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 835 F. Supp. 2d 705 (D. Minn.
2011), aff’d sub nom. Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1053)
(“[T]here is no rule that a statutes of repose can be satisfied only by filing lawsuits . . . .”); Brief
for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants and Reversal at 21, Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013)
(No. 11-4254) (“There is no rule that statutes of repose can be satisfied only by filing
lawsuits . . . .”).
123. Keiran, 720 F.3d at 732 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. Id. (recognizing that 29 U.S.C. § 1113 is a statute of repose (citing Radford v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., 151 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam))).
125. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1113).
126. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f)).
127. Id. (identified 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f) as a statute of repose (citing Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 360 (1991))).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 1113 (2012).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f) (2012).
130. Brief for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 22–23, Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255 (3d
Cir. 2013) (No. 11-4254) (noting how statutes of repose frequently require some action other than
filing a lawsuit to occur before the right expires).
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an unauthorized wire transfer from their account ‘within one year of
receiving notice of the account’s debit.’”131 The N.Y. UCC clearly indicated
that notifying the bank was the action required to exercise the right.132
While it is agreed upon that rescission under TILA is a statute of
repose, it is unclear why the courts that held notice alone to be insufficient
found Beach dispositive of the present issue. TILA’s right of rescission is
written similarly to the N.Y. UCC by clearly stating notice is the method of
enforcing the right of rescission. Since it is clear that a statute of repose
does not always require a suit to be commenced, and the facts from Beach
are dissimilar to the facts of the cases discussed in Part II, Beach is not
dispositive of the present issue.
IV. NOTICE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO EXERCISE
RESCISSION
A. PLAINMEANING CALLS FORNOTICE TO BE SUFFICIENT TO
EXERCISERIGHT OFRESCISSIONUNDER TILA AND
REGULATION Z
Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of the statute.133
When reading the plain language, courts must presume that the legislature
meant what the statute says. 134 “The Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized the importance of the plain meaning rule, stating that if the
language of a statute or regulation has a plain and ordinary meaning, courts
need look no further and should apply the regulation as it is written.”135
The statute clearly states in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) that “the obligor shall
have the right to rescind the transaction . . . by notifying the creditor, in
accordance with regulations of the Bureau, of his intention to do so.”136
Further, Regulation Z states that “[t]o exercise the right to rescind, the
consumer shall notify the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram or
other means of written communication.”137
The plain meaning of this statute is simple—notice is the action
required in order to rescind. Similar to the statute of repose in N.Y. UCC
section 4-A-505 where customers are only required to “notif[y] the bank of
131. Id. (citing Ma v. Merrill Lynch, 597 F.3d 84, 88–89 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing N.Y. UCC
§ 4-A-505)).
132. N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-A-505 (McKinney 2013).
133. Gilbert v. Residential Funding L.L.C., 678 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing United
States v. Bly, 510 F.3d 453, 460 (4th Cir. 2007)).
134. Id. (citing Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)).
135. Id. (citing Textron, Inc. v. Comm’r, 336 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 2003)); see also Keiran v.
Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 731 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“When a statutory text is clear the ‘sole function of the courts is to enforce the
plain language of the statute.’” (citing Coop v. Frederickson, 545 F.3d 652, 656 (8th Cir. 2008))).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012).
137. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(2) (2012).
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[their] objection[,]” to a debit from their account,138 all 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a)
and Regulation Z require the customer to do is send notice. The plain
language and ordinary meaning of rescission under § 1635(a) and
Regulation Z clearly state that the borrower needs to give notice.139 “Both
refer exclusively to written notification as the means by which an obligor
exercises his right of rescission.”140 Accordingly, the natural reading only
requires notice to be sent for the right of rescission to be exercised.141
B. NOTICE IS SUFFICIENT BASED ON THE STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
Even if not satisfied that the plain meaning of the statute is not
sufficiently convincing that all a borrower must do is provide notice to
exercise the right to rescind, statutory analysis points to notice being
sufficient as well.
If Congress wanted the borrower to exercise his right to rescind by
filing suit within the three-year period, Congress would have clearly stated
so.142 Section 1635 discusses the right of rescission.143 Two of the major
sections on rescission are § 1635(a) and § 1635(f). Section 1635(a)
discusses how to rescind 144 and § 1635(f) discusses when the right of
rescission expires. 145 Neither indicates a lawsuit is necessary to exercise the
138. N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-A-505 (McKinney 2013).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(2).
140. Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2013).
141. Id. at 267.
142. See Gilbert v. Residential Funding L.L.C., 678 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[C]ourts
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says
there.” (citing Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992))).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2012).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) states in full:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of any consumer credit
transaction (including opening or increasing the credit limit for an open end credit plan)
in which a security interest, including any such interest arising by operation of law, is
or will be retained or acquired in any property which is used as the principal dwelling
of the person to whom credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right to rescind the
transaction until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the
transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission forms required under this
section together with a statement containing the material disclosures required under this
subchapter, whichever is later, by notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations
of the Bureau, of his intention to do so. The creditor shall clearly and conspicuously
disclose, in accordance with regulations of the Bureau, to any obligor in a transaction
subject to this section the rights of the obligor under this section. The creditor shall also
provide, in accordance with regulations of the Bureau, appropriate forms for the obligor
to exercise his right to rescind any transaction subject to this section.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) states in full:
An obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation
of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first,
notwithstanding the fact that the information and forms required under this section or
any other disclosures required under this part have not been delivered to the obligor,
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right to rescind. 146 In fact, “only two provisions of § 1635 make any
mention” of court involvement,147 and neither provision mentions “whether
court involvement is necessary to effect rescission.”148
The first provision to mention court involvement is § 1635(b), which
outlines the obligations of each party following rescission being exercised.
Since § 1635(b) deals with obligations arising once the right of rescission is
exercised, any mention of court involvement intuitively should have no
effect on whether a suit is required in order to exercise one’s right to
rescind. This provision provides the court with the power to modify the
process that is invoked after rescission is exercised, if a court is so
inclined.149 To illustrate, imagine a lender brings suit after the borrower
sends notice of rescission. The lender claims it would be inequitable to
require the termination of any security interest prior to the borrower
returning the outstanding money owed. This provision allows the court to
condition the obligations of the lender on the borrower fulfilling his duties.
“[I]n no way [does this provision] suggest[] that court involvement is a sine
qua non for rescission.”150
The second provision that discusses court involvement is § 1635(g).151
This provision deals with additional relief that may be granted and states
that “[i]n any action in which it is determined that a creditor has violated
this section, in addition to rescission the court may award relief under
section 1640 of this title for violations of this subchapter not relating to the
right to rescind.”152 This provision was added to clarify that seeking relief
under § 1635 does not preclude one from seeking damages under § 1640;
they are not mutually exclusive.153
Since neither TILA nor Regulation Z says anything about the filing of a
lawsuit when exercising one’s right to rescind, the courts should not “graft
except that if (1) any agency empowered to enforce the provisions of this subchapter
institutes a proceeding to enforce the provisions of this section within three years after
the date of consummation of the transaction, (2) such agency finds a violation of this
section, and (3) the obligor’s right to rescind is based in whole or in part on any matter
involved in such proceeding, then the obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three
years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the earlier sale of the
property, or upon the expiration of one year following the conclusion of the proceeding,
or any judicial review or period for judicial review thereof, whichever is later.
146. Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 733 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
147. Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 2013).
148. Id.
149. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2012) (“The procedures prescribed by this subsection shall apply
except when otherwise ordered by a court.”).
150. Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 260.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(g) (2012).
152. Id.; see also Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 260.
153. Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 260.
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such a requirement upon [the borrowers].”154 It should not be assumed that
“Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it
nonetheless intends to apply, and [courts’] reluctance [should be] even
greater when Congress has shown elsewhere in the same statute that it
knows how to make such a requirement manifest.”155
On the other hand, § 1635(b) places obligations upon the lender.156
These obligations, which include returning to the borrower any money paid
and taking any action necessary to ensure the reflection of the terminated
security interest, arise upon the borrower sending notice of rescission in
accordance with § 1635(a).157 Based on the interpretation of this provision,
it is clear that the lender must perform obligations indicating that the right
of rescission has been exercised once notice is received—not after a
judgment by a court.
Lastly, TILA provides a statute of limitations for bringing damages
claims under § 1640, but does not provide such a limit when bringing a suit
for rescission. 158 Section 1640(e) provides that “any action under this
section may be brought in any United States district court, or in any other
court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date of the
occurrence.”159 Here, Congress clearly set out a statute of limitations for
bringing suit.160 However, no such requirement was set out for rescission.161
If Congress desired for there to be a limit governing suits for rescission
under § 1635, it would have clearly done so as it did under § 1640 on
damages.162 As such, no requirement should be written into the statute,
since actions or inactions of Congress must be thought of as intentional.163
Accordingly, the statutory interpretation of the relevant statutes, along with
the plain meaning, should sufficiently lead one to the conclusion that notice
is sufficient to exercise one’s right to rescind under TILA.
154. Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 2012). See 15 U.S.C. §
1635(a).
155. Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752, 763 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Jama v. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005)).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2012).
157. Id. (“Within 20 days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
158. Hartman, 734 F.3d at 762.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2012). 15 U.S.C. § 1640 discusses civil liability and damages.
160. Hartman, 734 F.3d at 762.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 763 (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute
but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (quoting Bates v. United
States, 522 U.S. 23, 29–30 (1997) (alteration in original))).
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C. POLICYREASONS FORWHYNOTICE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT
By holding notice to be sufficient, consistency will remain throughout
the statute. By allowing notice to be all that is required, courts are ensuring
consistency with the three-day absolute right of rescission and the three-
year right of rescission.164 Borrowers are given an absolute three-day right
of rescission under § 1635(a).165 If a borrower sends notice stating his intent
to exercise his right to rescind, the borrower is now going to wait up to
twenty days to see if the lender performs the obligations that have arisen
under § 1635(b) due to the notice of rescission.166 However, if the lender
does not perform as required under § 1635(b) within the twenty days and
the borrower then brings suit to exercise his rights, no court is going to say
the right expired when the three days were up. The borrower has no
obligation to file suit in the three-day period, partially since the “consumer
would seemingly have no basis for filing a suit during that time.”167 When
the borrower brings suit after the lender ignored or denied the notice to
rescind, the borrower is not trying to exercise his right to rescind, which
clearly expired, but to exercise the rights that have arisen from properly
invoking the right to rescind.168
The three-year period of exercising right to rescind should work the
same way.169 When the borrower sends his notice of rescission within the
three-year period that he is afforded, he should not have to file suit within
that three-year period to properly invoke the right to rescind. The suit
should be thought of as for the enforcement of the rights that arose after
rescission is exercised, not for exercising the right to rescind.170 In fact, if a
borrower sends notice one day before this right expires, he should not be
able to sue until twenty days have passed or until the lender informs the
borrower of his unwillingness to perform the obligations that have arisen
under § 1635(b); no cause of action should exist before then. 171 If the
borrower ultimately needs to bring suit, he must have a cause of action and
therefore the suit is not for the purpose of exercising the right to rescind, but
to determine whether the borrower had the right to rescind and if so to
164. See Sherzer v Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting how the
three-year period should work in the same manner as the three-day period).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012).
166. See id. § 1635(b).
167. Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 264.
168. See id. (“After the three-day period has expired, the obligor no longer has a ‘right to
rescission’—but because he exercised that right in a timely manner, he now has a statutory right to
his property and to clear title.”).
169. Id. (noting that the three year period should work in the same manner as the three-day
period).
170. See id. (“[The borrower] can file suit to compel the lender to comply with § 1635(b) if the
lender does not . . . .”).
171. These circumstances are the same circumstances that need to unfold under the three-day
period, namely the borrower needs to wait until the lender denies the notice of rescission or the
twenty days pass. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2012).
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enforce the obligations that arose from exercising that right.172 As the CFPB
points out, rescission in this context occurs upon notice.173 There is nothing
in the statute to indicate that the three-year right of rescission should
operate differently or inconsistently from the method that the three-day
right operates by.
Additionally, policy requires that the views of the CFPB be given
consideration 174 and deference 175 as the administration charged with
implementing and interpreting TILA. The CFPB which has filed briefs with
some of the circuit courts explaining their position of whether notice is
sufficient,176 has argued that the proper interpretation and the one consistent
with legislative intent, plain meaning, and statutory interpretation is that
notice alone is sufficient to exercise rescission.177
The CFPB also argues that the process for rescinding a transaction
under TILA is clear from a model form that the CFPB promulgated.178 The
App’x H. Model Form H-8 has a section titled “how to cancel.”179 Under
172. See Brief for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 18, Sobieniak v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 835 F.
Supp. 2d 705 (D. Minn. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th
Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1053) (noting that the purpose of litigation is not to cancel the contract but to
enforce the obligations arising from the cancelled contract).
173. Id. at 17. (“[T]he rescission is effective as of the notice date or not at all . . . .”).
174. Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752, 764 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[C]aution requires attentiveness to
the views of the administrative entity appointed to apply and enforce a statute.” (citing Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980))).
175. Id. (“[D]eference is especially appropriate in the process of interpreting [TILA] and
Regulation Z . . . .” (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980))).
176. Id.
177. See Brief for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal at 25, Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir.
2012) (No. 10-1442) (“The decision below holding that consumers must both notify their lender of
their decision to rescind and sue their lender to resolve any disputes arising from the rescission
within the three-year period set forth in § 1635(f) should be reversed.”). See also Brief for the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and
Reversal at 26, Sobieniak v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 835 F. Supp. 2d 705 (D. Minn.
2011), aff’d sub nom. Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1053)
(“This Court should reject a construction of § 1635 that also would require consumers to file suit
against their lenders within the same three-year timeframe . . . .”); Brief for the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at
27, Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-4254) (“This Court
should reject a construction of § 1635 that also would require consumers to file suit against their
lenders within the same three-year timeframe . . . .”).
178. Brief for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal at 6, Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir.
2012) (No. 10-1442); Brief for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 6, Sobieniak v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP,
835 F. Supp. 2d 705 (D. Minn. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721
(8th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1053); Brief for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 6, Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs.,
707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-4254).
179. 12 C.F.R. Pt. 1026 (2012), App. H. Model form H-8. See infra Appendix A for a blank
Model Form H-8.
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that section, a person who “decide[s] to cancel this transaction . . . may do
so by notifying us in writing.” 180 Additionally, the form states that
rescinding parties “may use any written statement that is signed and dated
by [them] and states [their] intention to cancel, or [they] may use this notice
by dating and signing below.”181 Nowhere on the form is there any mention
of a lawsuit. 182 In fact, the form acknowledges that upon notice being
received, the lender has twenty days to take the necessary steps
acknowledging that the right of rescission has been exercised.183 It is clear
from this form that the intent has always been that notice constitutes
rescission.
Furthermore, rescission under TILA operates in the same manner as
rescission at law.184 “[C]ourts have recognized two types of rescission—
rescission in equity and rescission at law.”185 Rescission in equity requires a
court to rescind the contract, 186 while rescission at law is accomplished by
“the unilateral act of one of the parties to [rescind] the contract.”187 The text
of TILA and Regulation Z make clear that TILA is “in the nature of
rescission at law.”188 Section 1635(a) and Regulation Z provide consumers
the right to rescind by notifying the creditor.189 After sending notice, §
1635(b) places obligations on the lender, such as removing the security
interest on the property that was part of the loan transaction. 190 If the
sections are read together, it is clear that rescission under TILA operates in
the same manner as rescission at law. 191 By operating the way rescission at






184. Brief for the Consumer Fininancial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 18, Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255 (3d
Cir. 2013) (No. 11-4254) (“This understanding of the purpose of litigation under § 1635 is
consistent with rescission at law in other contexts.”).
185. Id. at 15 (citing Griggs v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company, 385 F.3d 440, 445–46
(4th Cir. 2004)).
186. Id.
187. 12A C.J.S. Cancellation of Inst. § 5 (2013).
188. Brief for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 16, Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255 (3d
Cir. 2013) (No. 11-4254).
189. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(2) (2012).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b).
191. Brief for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 16, Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255 (3rd
Cir. 2013) (No. 11-4254).
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V. LENDER’S FEARS AND CONCERNS AND A SOLUTION TO
EASE THESE CONCERNS
One of the major reasons why the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
held that notice was not enough was a fear of the title being held by banks
becoming cloudy.192 When one takes out a home mortgage, the bank holds
title to the house until the loan is paid back. When a borrower exercises his
right to rescind, the title transfers back to the borrower.193 However, when
there is a disagreement over whether the borrower has a right to rescission,
it is unclear who holds title to the home—leading to a figurative cloud over
the title.194 While this may be of concern, lenders have the ability to resolve
any uncertainty regarding title by bringing a suit to clear up the
uncertainty.195 Another option the lender can take to resolve any uncertainty
is to work out an agreement privately with the borrower.196 Since the lender
has control over how long the uncertainty in title lasts, the fear of a cloudy
title should not override all the reasoning for allowing notice to be
sufficient.197 Placing the burden on the lender to clear up uncertainty with
the title encourages the lender to work out a private settlement with the
borrower.198 While permitting notice to be sufficient will likely add costs,
such as monitoring and response costs, which will be borne by the
192. See Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[U]ncertainties as to
title that would likely occur if the right is not effectuated by court filing within three years of the
underlying transaction, [is a] compelling [reason] for the conclusion that we draw.”); see also
Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[A]ccepting a
consumer’s unilateral notice of an intent to rescind as a legally effective exercise of rescission,
where the creditor has not in any sense actually acted on the consumer’s wishes . . . could work to
cloud the title of the property for an indefinite period of time.”).
193. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2012) (“When an obligor exercises his right to rescind . . . any
security interest given by the obligor . . . becomes void upon such a rescission.”).
194. See Cloud on Title, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Cloud+on+Title (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (citing West’s
Encyclopedia of American Law).
195. Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 266–67 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Once alerted to
the cloud on its title, a lender could sue to confirm that the obligor’s rescission was invalid . . . .”).
196. Keiran, 720 F.3d at 734 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197. Id. (The lender “can never be subject to an indefinitely clouded title without its own tacit
consent.”); see supra Part IV.
198. Danielle Godfrey, Note, Giving David Back His Stone: How Gilbert v. Residential
Funding Revitalizes the Truth In Lending Rescission Right and Enhances Consumer Protection
Under the Truth In Lending Act, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 547, 564 (2013).
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borrower, this is not a reason to ignore the text of the statute. 199 It is for
Congress to determine whether the increased costs are warranted.200
In addition to fear of a cloudy title, there is a concern that not requiring
suit within the three-year period will allow borrowers to abuse the
system.201 The fear is that borrowers will send notices of rescission, even if
the borrower knows that no claim exists, in an attempt to pressure the
lender into a settlement.202 Therefore, by requiring suit, a borrower will
only send a rescission notice when the borrower is certain to have a non-
frivolous claim.203 However, this fear of borrowers abusing the system is
likely overblown.204 Even if this fear is accurate, the lenders would likely
adjust to the fear, either with increased costs passed onto the borrowers or
through some adjustment in their business practices.
While fear of cloudy title or borrowers abusing the system may have
some theoretical merit, requiring suit to be filed within the three-year period
will have unwanted consequences that outweigh any negative impact from
not requiring suit within the first three years. Lenders, with knowledge that
a suit must be filed, will be encouraged to ignore rescission notices until a
suit is brought.205 Additionally, the lenders, who respond to the notice, will
be encouraged to “stonewall” borrowers. 206 When “stonewalling”
borrowers, the lender will inform the borrower that they are looking into the
rescission notice to see if a cause of action exists. 207 The lender will
continue assuring the borrower that it is looking into the matter when in
reality the lender is just holding the borrower off until the three-year period
expires.208 Ultimately, these two practices will lead to borrowers filing suit
199. Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1185 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting how over
time circumstances are likely to change making enforcement costly and difficult); Sherzer, 707
F.3d at 267 (noting how allowing rescission through notice potentially imposes additional costs on
banks, but that increased costs is not a reason to disregard the text of the statute); Levi Smith,
Comment, Notice is Not Enough: Why TILA Requires More Than a Letter of Intent, 2 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 13A, 14A–15A (2013) (noting how not knowing whether a loan transaction is final
will add monitoring and response costs).
200. Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 267 (noting how many TILA regulations increase costs for lenders
and it is up to Congress to determine how to proceed).
201. Smith, supra note 199, at 14A–15A.
202. Id. at 15A.
203. Id.
204. Cf. id. (“Given that asserting an intention to rescind is without cost (unlike a lawsuit), it’s
likely that lenders will receive more of these notices in an attempt by borrowers to influence
restructuring and foreclosure negotiations by threatening full rescission, even beyond the three-
year period.”).
205. Godfrey, supra note 198, at 565.
206. Brief for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal at 19, Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir.
2012) (No. 10-1442).
207. Godfrey, supra note 198, at 566.
208. Id.
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immediately, 209 further congesting an already swamped legal system,
instead of attempting to work the matter out privately as Congress
envisioned.210
While a suit should not be required within the three-year period, there
must be a limit on how long the borrower has to bring suit.211 While no
solution is going to be perfect, any solution should ease lenders’ concerns,
protect consumers, and conform to Congressional intent. A statute of
limitation period for bringing suit within a certain time frame from when
the lender rejects notice or the three-year period imposed by § 1635(f)
expires, whichever is later, would satisfy the above criteria. Since
Congressional intent was for the matter to be worked out privately,212 the
time limit set should be long enough to foster good faith negotiations, and
at the same time, not too long so that the parties do not feel some pressure
to work out an agreement. Additionally, by starting the time limit from
when the lender rejects the rescission notice, lenders are prevented from
being able to “stonewall” or ignore rescission notices.213 Furthermore, by
setting a limit on how long the consumer has to bring suit, if needed, the
lender is protected by any concerns, whether warranted or not, over cloudy
title.214 This solution conforms to Congressional intent, plain language of
the statute, and statutory interpretation of the statute. 215 By protecting
consumers and easing lenders concerns while at the same time conforming
to what Congress intended, this solution acts as a fair compromise.
CONLUSION
TILA requires lenders to make certain disclosures to borrowers.216 If
the lender does not make all of the required disclosures, the borrower has
three years from the consummation of the transaction to rescind the
contract.217 Notwithstanding the opinions of the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits, all the borrower needs to do to rescind the contract is to
209. Brief for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal at 18–19, Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th
Cir. 2012) (No. 10-1442) (noting how borrowers will file suit immediately instead of working
privately with the lender).
210. Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 734 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (Congress’s goal was to make “the rescission process a private one . . .
.” (citing Belini v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2005))).
211. Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 267 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[I]f the obligor
mails a notice of rescission but takes no action for ten years, the lender can at least be assured that
the obligor will not be able to file a timely court action.”).
212. Keiran, 720 F.3d at 734 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (Congress’s goal was to make “the rescission process a private one . . . .” (citing Belini v.
Wash. Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2005))).
213. See supra Part V.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012).
217. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).
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send notice within the three-year period. 218 The Supreme Court should
follow the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits,219 and hold that suit does
not need to be filed within the three-year period. Ultimately, it may be up to
Congress and the CFPB to adjust TILA and Regulation Z to make it clear
that all that is required is notice, especially if the Supreme Court sides with
the circuits requiring suit to be filed.
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